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"STATUTORY NONDELEGATION": LEARNING 
FROM FLORIDA'S RECENT EXPERIENCE 
IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE REFORM 
Jim Rossi* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
[T]o be blunt, the history of American administrative law 
is a history of failed ideas. 1 
If Professor Mashaw's observation rings true at the federal 
level, it might be said to hit us like a steamroller in the states. Most 
state administrative procedure acts (APAs) are of a more recent 
vintage than the Federal AP A, which was adopted in 1946. Thus, 
state APAs are more likely to reflect the fashion of the 1960s, 
1970s, or 1980s than the time-tested ideas of their federal 
counterpart. In addition, state AP As are much more detailed than 
the Federal APA, making it more likely that not courts but state 
legislatures-hardly known for their competence, let alone their 
appreciation of administrative governance-are the source of new 
ideas in administrative procedure. Also, state APAs are amended 
far more frequently than the Federal APA. Florida's APA, for 
example, has been amended almost every single year since its 
adoption in 1974. None of this should come as a surprise. States, 
after all, are laboratories of democracy and laboratories (like 
democracies) produce failed experiments as well as successful ones. 
In 1996 Florida adopted the most comprehensive set of changes 
in the history of its APA. Florida's 1996 APA amendments grew 
out of a reform effort that had been brewing for years, culminating 
in the appointment by then-Governor Lawton Chiles of a 
• Patricia A. Dore Associate Professor of State Administrative Procedure, 
Florida State University College of law. Thanks to Scott Boyd, Natalie Futch, 
Harold Krent, Ron Levin, and Joshua Sarnoff for their comments on draft. 
1 JERRY L. MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 1 (1983). 
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fifteen-member AP A Review Commission. Following several 
months of deliberations, the AP A Review Commission produced 
proposals, which the Florida Legislature adopted with significant 
amendments and which Governor Chiles signed into law in 1996. 
These amendments were designed to simplify Florida's AP A and to 
promote accountability and flexibility in the administrative process. 2 
Following adoption of Florida's 1996 APA reforms, I 
expressed cautious skepticism, characterizing them as a rulemaking 
11counter-revolution11:3 many provisions in the 1996 reforms pose a 
tension with the Florida Legislature's traditional effort to favor 
rulemaking as the primary vehicle for the executive branch's 
implementation of policy in the state. 4 Writing today, I believe that 
it is highly questionable whether Florida's 1996 amendments have 
achieved the objectives of the reformers. I think, however, the 1996 
reforms provide a useful context for examining reforms in Florida 
and elsewhere aimed at fixing accountability problems, particularly 
in the rulemaking context. 
In this Article, I assess one of the more notable reforms Florida 
made to its APA in 1996 with the intention of enhancing the 
accountability of agency rulemaking, and I discuss the lessons other 
state reformers can learn from Florida's experience. Part Il of this 
Article discusses rulemaking authority under the Federal AP A and 
the more restrictive approach many states take to ensure that 
agencies are accountable to the legislature in proposing rules. Some 
states, including Pennsylvania, have endorsed what I will term 
11 statutory nondelegation 11: This is a judicially-adopted or 
2 &e FINAL REPORT OF TIIE GOVERNOR'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
REVIEW COMMISSION 1 {1996) (citing goals of "simplifying the APA, increasing 
flexibility-in the application of administrative rules and procedures, and increasing 
agency accountability to the Legislature and the general public"). 
3 See Jim Rossi, The 1996 Revised Florida Administrative Procedure Act: A 
Rulemaking Revolution or Counter-Revolution?, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 345 (1997) 
(observing that Florida's 1996 APA amendments were too fresh to provide sound 
data for criticism, but that they should be re-evaluated in the future when more data 
and anecdotes regarding their effects are available). 
4 Section 120.54(l)(a) of Florida's APA, added in 1991 , requires agencies to 
use rulemaking to make statements of general applicability to the extent it is 
practicable and feasible. See Fl.A. STAT. ANN. § 120.54(1)(a) (West Supp. 1999). 
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APA-imposed clear statement requirement, suggesting that courts 
or administrative law judges (AI..Js) review rules independently to 
ensure that they are based in apparent and specific statutory 
authority, rather than promulgated under implied powers from 
general grants of authority. Similar to the nondelegation doctrine, 
which exists in many states as a constitutional restraint on legislative 
delegations of rulemaking authority to agencies absent specific 
statutory authority and standards, statutory nondelegation is 
intended to ensure that agencies are accountable to the will of the 
legislature. States endorse statutory nondelegation with differing 
degrees of strength: While Pennsylvania judicially endorses a 
modest form of statutory nondelegation, Florida's 1996 APA 
reforms exemplify a radical and strong version, similar to what the 
United States Congress considered more than twenty years ago in 
the failed Bumpers Amendment to the Federal AP A. 
In Part ill of this Article, I discuss some of the problems with 
efforts to enhance accountability by requiring statutory 
nondelegation in state APAs, using the recent Florida reform and 
its implementation as an example. Part IV discusses Florida's 1999 
AP A amendments, passed primarily as a reaction to legislative 
dissatisfaction with judicial interpretation of Florida's 1996 APA 
amendments. In Part V, I generalize from Florida's experience to 
suggest some lessons for Pennsylvania and other state reformers. 
While statutory nondelegation is consistent with the concerns 
of states that endorse a stronger constitutional nondelegation 
doctrine than federal courts, I argue that enforcement of statutory 
nondelegation is best institutionalized within a legislature, not with 
ALJs or the courts. States, like Pennsylvania, that have judicially 
endorsed statutory nondelegation should consider abandoning the 
doctrine in AP A reforms or removing courts and AI..Js from its 
enforcement. Whatever a state does, though, it should steer away 
from Florida's approach to statutory nondelegation. If a state 
emulates Florida in adopting this provision of Florida's APA (or a 
version similar to it), a range of problems relating to judicial review 
and statutory interpretation are likely to emerge on the reform map, 
as they have in Florida. If Florida's experience is any indication, 
the resolution of such problems in the AP A reform process will not 
always promote sound agency policy making. 
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While Florida's approach to law reform has not generated what 
I believe to be desirable additions to administrative procedure for 
the state, other states can learn from Florida's law reform process. 
Specifically, for as often as it has amended its APA, Florida has 
generally disfavored the use of law reform commissions as a vehicle 
for vetting reform proposals. Florida's 1996 APA Review 
Commission, appointed by its Governor, provided a somewhat 
tempered forum for considering several modest and reasonable 
reform proposals, but its temporary life did not work to limit the 
proposal-and adoption-of radical administrative procedure reforms 
endorsed by antiregulation interest groups in the state. States 
considering AP A reform might take a lesson from Florida's 
experience in the AP A reform process and consider establishing a 
long-term administrative procedure revision commission, as 
California and Michigan have used in recent years. 5 Establishing a 
long-term commission, with a stake in the reform process and its 
outcome, might lead to more systematic reform proposals, allowing 
for evaluation of their implementation and successes or failures. 
II. STATUTORY NONDELEGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, 
than that wherever the end is required, the means are 
authorized; whenever a general power to do a thing is 
given, every particular power necessary for doing it is 
included.6 
Madison's axiom-that the general includes the particular-is a 
fundamental precept of federal administrative procedure. Although 
a federal administrative agency is required to state the source of its 
rulemaking authority when it provides notice of proposed rules, it 
5 See Michael Asimow, Speed Bumps on the Road to Administrative Law 
Reform in California and Pennsylvania, 8 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 229 (1999); Steven 
P. Croley, State Administrative Law Reform: Recent Experience in Michigan, 8 
WIDENER]. PuB. L. 347 (1999). 
6 THE FEDERAUST No. 44 (James Madison). 
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operates under the assumption that general legislative grants of 
power include the particular. Yet some states, including 
Pennsylvania, have judicially required more specific statutory 
authority as a basis for an agency regulation. Such requirements 
find weak endorsement in the language of the 1981 Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA),7 which requires an agency 
to cite to specific statutory authority for rules. Recent state AP A 
reformers, most notably in Florida, however, have set out to 
strengthen the requirement of specific authority for rulemaking far 
beyond what the Federal APA and the 1981 MSAPA would require. 
A. Requirements in the Federal APA 
Consistent with Madison's well-accepted precept, the Federal 
AP A does not require an agency to have specific statutory authority 
prior to promulgating a rule. Section 553 of the Federal AP A 
requires an agency's notice of proposed rulemaking (NOPR) to 
contain a "reference to the legal authority under which the rule is 
proposed. "8 On occasion, courts have invalidated agency rules for 
failure to comply with this notice requirement. For example, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
held as reversible error the Interstate Commerce Commission's 
(ICC's) failure to cite the specific statutory authorization for its 
rulemaking authority in its original notice of rules regarding the 
licensing of tour brokers. 9 
7 MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT §§ 1-101 to 5-205 (1981), 15 
U.L.A. 1-136 (1990). The 1981 MSAPA, adopted by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was an update and re-examination of the 
1961 MSAPA. Id. , historical note, 15 U.L.A at 1 .  
8 5 u.s.c. § 553(b)(2) (1994). 
9 National Tour Brokers Ass'n v. United States, 591 F.2d 896, 900, 903 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978) (observing, in the sole statute cited, notice was understood to need 
congressional alteration or amendment and the rule finally issued was based on 
different statutory authorization than the proposed rule). But see Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 864-65 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (noting 
agency's failure to cite specific statutory authorization for a rule in its notice of 
proposed rulemaking is not itself a fatal procedural error where statutory 
authorization is given in other referenced statrites). 
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Despite this notice requirement, federal case law 
overwhelmingly suggests that a general grant of rulemaking 
authority in a statute suffices to establish agency authority to 
promulgate rules. The Supreme Court endorsed this principle in 
Mourning v. Fam.fly Publications Service, Inc. , 10 where it addressed 
the Federal Reserve Board's "four installment" rule. This regulation 
requires sellers to comply with the disclosure requirements of the 
Truth in Lending Act to those to whom they extend consumer credit 
without finance charges if the sum owed is payable in more than 
four installments. In reasoning that the Board's rule did not exceed 
its statutory authority, the Court stated: 
The standard to be applied in determining whether the 
Board exceeded the authority delegated to it under the 
Truth in Lending Act is well established under our prior 
cases. Where the empowering provision of a statute states 
simply that the agency may "make . . . such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions 
of this Act," we have held that the validity of a regulation 
promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as it is 
"reasonably related to the pm:poses of the enabling 
legislation. "11 
Noting ambiguity in the statutory language, the Court observed 
"where reasonable minds may differ as to which of several remedial 
measures should be chosen, courts should defer to the informed 
experience and judgment of the agency to whom Congress delegated 
appropriate authority. "12 To hold the rule outside the scope of the 
agency's authority, the Court reasoned, "would undermine the 
flexibility sought in vesting broad rulemaking authority in an 
administrative agency. "13 
Federal circuit courts routinely follow this deferential approach. 
In a recent case involving the rulemaking powers of the Surface 
Transportation Board (STB), the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia held that the agency acted within its authority when it 
10 411 U.S. 356 (1973). 
11 Id. at 369 (citations omitted). 
12 Id. at 371-72 (citations omitted). 
13 Id. at 372. 
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modified criteria adopted for exempting purchasers of short line 
railroads from normal certification.14 Challengers argued that STB 
was authorized by statute to deregulate, rather than adopt new 
regulations.15 The District of Columbia Circuit, however, applied 
Chevron deference16 and upheld the agency's interpretation of its 
statutory powers to the extent the interpretation was reasonable. 17 
On occasion, federal courts, however, have held that the clear 
meaning of an unambiguous statute can confine an agency's 
authority to promulgate rules, on either statutory18 or constitutional19 
14 Association of American R.Rs. v. Surface Transp. Bel., 161F.3 d58, 60 
(D.C. Cir. 1998). 
IS Id. at 62-63. 
16 Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), federal courts reviewing agency interpretations of 
statutes apply a two-part test. See id. At step one, a court asks "whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Id. at 842. If so, "the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress."  Id. at 842-43. At step two, a Court defers to the agency's permissible 
construction: "[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. 
17 American R. Rs. , 161 F .3d at 63 -64. 
18 See, e. g. , Kelley v. Environmental Protection Agency, 15 F.3 d  1100, 1106 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (invalidating agency rule defining scope of lender liability as "in 
excess of agency statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations " under section 706 
of the APA because the court read statutory language to suggest Congress "quite 
consciously" left liability issues to be decided by the courts, not the EPA); Global 
Van Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 714 F.2d 1290, 1294-95  (5th Cir. 
1983) (invalidating rule regulating entirely new sector of the industry based solely 
on general statutory grants of authority, including a provision that authorized 
issuance Of II 'only SUCh rules and regulations • • • as may be necessary to carry 0Ut 
[the other] provisions'") (quoting Interstate Commerce Act, pt. IV, ch. 318, 
§ 403 (a), 56 Stat. 284, 285 (1942) (superseded 1978)). 
19 A 1999 District of Columbia Circuit panel invoked the nondelegation 
doctrine as a reason for reversing the Environmental Protection Agency's 
interpretation of the scope of its authority to set ambient air quality standards under 
the Clean Air Act. See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 175 F.3 d  1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999). While the District of Columbia Circuit 
panel drew on the rhetoric of nondelegation, it did not strike down the statutory 
provision but only the EPA's reading of it. See id. at 1037-38. In the panel's view, 
the EPA' s reading of its authority under the statute would have made Congress's 
action unconstitutional. 
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grounds. Courts, however, generally defer to reasonable agency 
interpretations regarding statutory authority for specific rules issued 
pursuant·to general statutory grants of authority.20 
The principle that agencies have sweeping authority to 
promulgate rules based on nothing more than general statutory 
language has on occasion been a target for federal reformers. In the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress considered a proposal to 
significantly narrow agency rulemaking authority under the AP A. 
This proposal, advanced by Senator Dale Bumpers, grew out of a 
dispute between the federal funding agency for education programs 
and a small school district in the Senator's home state of Arkansas. 
The Bumpers proposal would have amended the judicial review 
sections of the AP A, 21 directing courts to "require that action by the 
agency is within the scope of the agency jurisdiction or authority on 
the basis of the language of the statute or, in the event of ambiguity, 
other evidence of ascertainable legislative intent. "22 Although the 
Bumpers Amendment was not enacted into law, it did not die easily 
and continued to surface for several years in reform discussions 
before Congress. 
20 See, e.g., Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan/Korea v. Federal 
Maritime Comm'n, 650 F.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 984 
(1981) (upholding agency authority to promulgate rules regarding matters previously 
adjudicated where Congress has granted both rulemaking and adjudicative 
authority); Hooker Chems. & Plastics v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(upholding the EPA's reference to general authority for rules, but reversing and 
remanding on other grounds). Cf. Village of Bergen v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Comm'n, 33 F.3d 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (deferring to agency's interpretation of its 
own jurisdiction as a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory language). 
One of the reasons courts defer to agency interpretations of jurisdiction is that they 
are unable to cogently distinguish between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional 
interpretations. See Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency 
Interpretations that Delimit the Scope of the Agency's Jurisdiction, 61 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 957 (1994). 
21 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1994). 
22 128 CONG. REc. S1217 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982). For criticism of this 
provision of the Bumpers Amendment, see Ronald M. Levin, Comment, Review of 
"Jurisdictional" Issues Under the Bumpers Amendment, 1983 DUKE L.J. 355, 
371-78; James T. O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of 
the Bwnpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 739, 773-76 (1980). 
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In 1994, more than a decade after the extreme Bumpers 
Amendment failed enactment, Senator Robert Dole proposed, as a 
part of a cost-benefit restriction bill, a proposal intended to restrict 
agency authority to promulgate new regulations. Dole's proposal 
prohibited agencies from promulgating rules where it is not 
necessary to achieve a statutory objective. The proposal stated: 
"[A]ny rule that expands Federal power or jurisdiction beyond the 
level of regulatory action needed to satisfy statutory requirements 
shall be prohibited. "23 Against the spirit of federal case law, the 
Dole proposal would have left to courts the task of determining 
when rules are necessary for puiposes of satisfying the minimum 
level of regulatory action required by statute. This amendment also 
failed congressional approval. 
B. Statutory Nondelegation Requirements in State Courts 
Congress accepted neither the Bumpers nor the Dole proposals, 
but both endorsed a principle that is supported in the decisions of 
some state courts. In contrast to courts' inteipretations of 
rulemaking requirements under the Federal AP A, some state courts 
impose more stringent standards on agencies promulgating rules. 
Decisions by these courts, both in rhetoric and result, severely 
restrict the authority of agencies to promulgate rules (or to regulate 
more generally) absent specific authority in statutes-in effect, a 
"statutory nondelegation" doctrine. 
The requirement of clear and specific statutory authorization for 
agency rules assists state courts in implementing the nondelegation 
doctrine, which is more strongly enforced by state courts than at the 
federal level. 24 By striking agency rules for failure to comply with 
specific grants of legislative authority, state courts can achieve the 
goals of the nondelegation doctrine without explicitly addressing the 
23 S. 343, 104th Cong. § 627(a) (1995). 
24 See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of 
Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 V AND. L. REY. 1167 
(1999) (discussing the nondelegation doctrine in the states and explaining the 
institutional design factors that may make it more necessary than in the federal 
system). 
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constitutional issue. Like the constitutional nondelegation doctrine, 
statutory nondelegation is intended to increase the accountability of 
agency rulemaking to the will of the legislature. By working as a 
type of clear statement rule, 25 statutory nondelegation provides some 
way to assure that agencies regulate activities only where it is 
manifest that the legislature intended this to occur. 
For example, while Pennsylvania's APA endorses a basic 
rulemaking process similar to that at the federal level, 26 
Pennsylvania courts have developed a statutory nondelegation 
doctrine. Courts in the state observe the standard that "power and 
authority exercised by an administrative agency in its rule-making 
must be conferred by language that is clear and unmistakable and 
the regulatory action must be within strict and exact limits defined 
by statute. "27 This standard was used to invalidate Board of 
Medicine rules providing that medical and osteopathic physicians 
could not use amphetamines to treat a patient unless the physician 
was treating the patient for a disease the Board had decided could 
receive long term amphetamine treatment. 28 The reviewing court 
reasoned the Board did not have the authority to promulgate the 
challenged regulations because they did not constitute a "standard 
25 See, e. g. , John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of 
Clear Statement Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REv. 771 (critiquing clear statement rules, 
particularly in the sovereign immunity context). 
26 The rulemaking provisions of Pennsylvania's "AP A" (three distinct statutes, 
really) appear at 45 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1102, 1201-1208 (West 1991). 
Remaining provisions of Pennsylvania's 11APA11 are codified elsewhere. 2 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 101-754 (West 1995) (general provisions for adjudication and 
judicial review); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 745.2-.12 (West 1990) (Regulatory 
Review Act, providing for oversight of rulemaking by the Independent Regulatory 
Review Commission). The scattered provisions of Pennsylvania's statutes governing 
administrative procedure make the administrative process seem more difficult than 
it really is-probably not just for outsiders, like myself, but for the average citizen. 
If nothing else, Pennsylvania could benefit from some of the "simplification" 
measures Florida endorsed in its 1996 reforms. 
ZT Pennsylvania Med. Soc'y v. State Bel. of Osteopathic Med.,  546 A.2d 720, 
722-23 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (determining regulations are outside the authority 
of agency) (citing DeMarco v. Department of Health, 397 A.2d 61 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1979)). 
28 Id. at 721. 
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of care" and the purpose of the statute implemented did not 
"encompassO a compulsory patient-specific review of diagnoses and 
treatment provided by a licensed practitioner where there is no 
indication that any provision of . . . the Medical Practice Act . . . 
ha[ d] been violated. "29 
The Pennsylvania statutory nondelegation requirement, which 
can be traced to early Pennsylvania cases, 30 subjects agency 
rulemaking authority to a type of strict scrutiny on appeal. For 
instance, in Morrison v. State Board of Medi.cine, 31 a court sustained 
Board of Medicine objections to a request for declaratory judgment 
authorizing a particular treatment program for cancer patients. 32 The 
court reasoned that, since the "purpose of the [Medical Practice] 
Act [wa]s to provide for the proper licensing of doctors by duly 
constituted boards that, through administrative regulation, could set 
standards of care and conduct," approval of the requested treatment 
program was "outside the scope of power granted by the 
legislature. "33 Although Pennsylvania courts review the statutory 
authority for agency rulemaking, they also appear to give agency 
interpretations of statutes some degree of deference. 34 
Pennsylvania is not unique in its judicial adoption of statutory 
nondelegation. Texas courts have held that an agency can only 
adopt rules "within the clear intent of the statutory authority 
conferred on the agency11 and "may not impose additional burdens, 
conditions, or restrictions in excess of [or inconsistent with 
relevant] statutory provisions. "35 The Texas approach, by 
29 Id. at 723. 
30 See, e.g. , Day v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 167 A. 565, 566 (Pa. 1933). The 
Day court determined that "the Public Service Commission, being a creature of the 
Legislature, is vested only with those powers conferred by statute 'or such as are 
implied necessarily from a grant of such powers'" and the legislative grant of 
powers must be clear. Id. (quoting Harmony Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 78 
Pa. Super. Ct. 271, 280 (1922)). 
31 618 A.2d 1098 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 1100. 
34 See Campo v. State Real Estate Comm'n, 723 A.2d 260 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1998) (analyzing statutory authority for rule but upholding agency's rule). 
35 Sinclair v. Albertson's, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 662, 666 (fex. App. 1998). 
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emphasizing the requirement of clear and specific statutory 
authority, 36 removes from judicial review any notion of deference 
to agency statutory interpretations where statutes are ambiguous or 
unclear, instead suggesting de novo review of agency rules for 
compliance with statutory authority. 
For example, a Texas appellate court, applying the doctrine, 
invalidated as outside of the agency's statutory authority Railroad 
Commission rules promulgated to protect the correlative rights of 
oil producers. 37 The Railroad Commission cited several sources of 
authority as a basis for adopting these rules, including statutory 
provisions giving the Commission the authority to adopt rules 
necessary to prevent waste, requiring corrective action when 
conservation laws or rules are violated, and requiring persons to 
.keep accurate records of oil produced. 38 After noting that none of 
the statutory provisions cited by the agency expressly authorized the 
use of rulemaking for purposes of protecting the correlative rights 
of oil producers, 39 the court addressed whether any of the provisions 
impliedly granted power to the agency. The court reasoned that 
each grant of rulemaking authority contained provisions delimiting 
purposes for which the Commission may promulgate rules, and that 
no designation of purposes included the protection of correlative 
rights. 40 Thus, applying the canon expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, the court concluded that the legislature's express 
designation of purposes implied lack of authorization for other 
purposes. 41 
36 Cf. Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. City of Austin, 524 S.W.2d 262, 267 (Tex. 
1975). To summarize the decisions regarding rulemaking, " [t]he Court has generally 
held that the Commission has only such powers as are specifically delegated to the 
Commission." Id. at 267. 
37 Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Arco Oil & Gas Co., 876 S.W.2d 473, 481 
(Tex. App. 1994). 
38 Id. at 483. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 483-84. The court also observed that the Commission's enabling 
legislation contemplated the use of an evidentiary hearing prior to the adoption of 
production allocation standards. Id. at 484. 
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Although illustrative of what some states do, the rigorous 
approach of Pennsylvania and Texas courts in reviewing the 
statutory authority for agency rules is not followed in every state. 
Consider, for example, the approach of Missouri courts. The 
Missouri APA, like the Federal AP A, required a notice of proposed 
rulemaking to contain notice of "[t]he legal authority upon which 
the proposed rule is based. "42 In a notice of proposed rulemaking 
regarding asbestos removal regulations, the Missouri Air 
Conservation Commission cited to a general rule enabling statute 
that granted the agency authority to adopt rules for purposes of 
complying with the Federal Clean Air Act. 43 The agency failed to 
cite to a section of Missouri's statutes that specifically authorized 
the regulation of asbestos removal projects. 44 On appeal the agency 
conceded the more specific statutory authority was "more proper" 
than the general grant; but, the Missouri Supreme Court refused to 
reverse the agency's rulemaking.45 The court reasoned that the 
broad grant of authority in the agency's general enabling statute met 
the AP A's notice requirement and provided an adequate legal basis 
for the rule. 46 
C. Statutory Nondelegation and Recent State APA Reforms 
A comparison between the texts of the Federal AP A and the 
1981 MS.APA suggests some difference in the degree of specific 
statutory authority required. In contrast to the Federal APA, which 
only requires a "reference to the legal authority under which the 
rule is proposed, "47 the 1981 MSAP A, requires a notice of proposed 
rulemaking to contain "the specific legal authority authorizing the 
proposed rule. "48 Thus, at least in its text, the language of the 1981 
42 Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.021.2(2) (1999). 
43 Corvera Abatement Techs., Inc. v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 973 S.W.2d 
851, 855 (Mo. 1998) (en bane) (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 643.050 (1999)). 
44 Id. (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 643.225 (1999)). 
4s Id. 
46 Id. 
47 5 u.s.c. § 553(b)(2) (1994). 
48 MODEL STATE AD.MIN. PROCEDURE ACT, §  3-103 (1981), 15 U.L.A. 35 
(1990) (emphasis added). 
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MSAPA suggests a stricter standard than that in the Federal APA. 
No states adopting the MSAPA, however, appear to have applied 
this standard to restrict agency rulemaking authority. Although the 
language of the 1981 MSAP A might parallel the approach of some 
state courts, such as those in Pennsylvania and Texas, it is a weaker 
standard that speaks to the procedure rather than substance of 
agency rulemaking.49 
Despite the modest approach of the 1981 MSAPA, more 
aggressive statutory nondelegation restrictions appear in the 
language of several state APAs and have been a popular mechanism 
among AP A reformers bent on enhancing the accountability of 
agencies to the legislative branch. An example is Minnesota's AP A, 
which states: "Authority to adopt original rules [is] restricted. 1150 
This language suggests some limit on the statutory authority of 
agencies to promulgate rules, but no cases to date have applied it to 
restrict agency authority to promulgate rules. 
Other recent state AP A reforms, perhaps inspired by the 
provision in the Dole reform bill, also include statutory 
nondelegation provisions. In 1995 Washington added a section to its 
49The purpose of this language in the notice standard of the 1981 MSAPA was 
to reduce, not increase, the number of rules invalidated. Professor Bonfield, reporter 
for the 1981 MSAPA, wrote: 
Requiring the notice of proposed rule adoption to indicate the specific 
legal authority supporting the issuance of that rule will help keep rule 
making lawful. This requirement should increase the likelihood that 
agencies will carefully consider their authority to adopt each rule they 
propose prior to the time they first propose it. Over a period of time, that 
should reduce the possibility that proposed rules will, on closer 
consideration by agencies, tum out to be outside the scope of their 
authority. The requirement that agencies specify in their notice of 
proposed rule adoption the precise legal authority for their contemplated 
action should also help to reduce the number of instances in which an 
adopted rule will be declared invalid by a court after the agency has 
expended substantial time and money to adopt it. 
ARTIIUREARLBONFIELD, STATEADMINISTRATIVERUI.EMAKING 175-76 (1986). It 
seems that how exacting and rigid courts are in their expectations of statutory 
precision will determine how frequently agency rules are reversed, but Bonfield's 
interpretation of the notice requirement suggests that it is a procedural rather than 
a substantive one. 
• 50 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.05(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999). 
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APA that states "an agency may not rely solely on the section of 
[the] law stating a statute's intent or purpose, or on the enabling 
provisions of the statute establishing the agency, or on any 
combination of such provisions, for its statutory authority to adopt 
the rule. "51 Florida's 1996 APA revisions went a step further, 
adding to its AP A a remarkable section which states: 
A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not 
sufficient to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific law 
to be implemented is also required. An agency may adopt 
only rules that implement, interpret, or make specific the 
particular powers and duties granted by the enabling 
statute. No agency shall have authority to adopt a rule only 
because it is reasonably related to the purpose of the 
enabling legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious, nor 
shall an agency have the authority to implement statutory 
provisions setting forth general legislative intent or policy. 
Statutory language granting rulemaking authority or 
generally describing the powers and functions of an agency 
shall be construed to extend no further than the particular 
powers and duties conferred by the same statute. 52 
This 1996 Florida reform, which echoes aspects of the lapsed 
Federal Bumpers Amendment and Dole reform proposal, is perhaps 
the most restrictive of those in state APAs, and thus worthy of some 
discussion. Florida's 1996 statutory nondelegation standard 
modified preexisting case law that held, consistent with the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Mourning, that a rule is valid if 
it is reasonably related to the enabling statute and not arbitrary and 
capricious. 53 
51 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §  34.05.322 (West Supp. 1999). 
52 Fr.A. STAT. ANN. § 120.536(1) (West Supp. 1999) (amended 1999). As is 
discussed infra in Part IV, the language of this standard was amended in 1999, but 
its overall structure remains in Florida's APA. 
53 As the Florida Supreme Court stated: 
Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that an agency 
may "make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out 
the provisions of this Act," the validity of the regulations promulgated 
thereunder will be sustained as long as they are reasonably related to the 
purposes of the enabling legislation, and are not arbitrary or capricious. 
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This statutory nondelegation requirement is also incorporated 
into the "[i]nvalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" 
standard for AI.J review of challenged rules in section 120.52(8) of 
Florida's APA.54 In Florida, rules can be challenged before an AU 
on several grounds, including failure to comply with this statutory 
nondelegation standard. 55 Proposed rules are immediately subject to 
the new standard. 56 For an interim period, existing rules were 
evaluated by agencies and by the Legislature to determine whether 
additional statutory authorization was necessary. Following July 1, 
1999, all existing rules were subject to legal challenge based on the 
new statutory nondelegation standard. 57 
Florida's 1996 statutory nondelegation provision caught many 
agencies by surprise. The proposal, borrowed from language in an 
APA reform bill Governor Chiles vetoed in 1995, was incorporated 
into Florida's APA without independent evaluation by the APA 
Review Commission. Governor Chiles did not express strong 
protest to this provision, as he did several other aspects of the 
vetoed 1995 reforms. Notably, the Review Commission did not 
explicitly recommend adoption of the statutory nondelegation 
standard in 1997. Instead, the provision (based on a provision in the 
amended 1995 bill) was added to the APA amendments during the 
legislative adoption process, at the urging of interest groups 
attempting to reign in agency power in a climate where 
antiregulation sentiment ran strong. These same interest groups 
failed to have the provision adopted in their previous reform efforts, 
but were able to attach it to the larger, more moderate APA reform 
bill drafted by the Review Commission. The AP A Review 
Commission did not debate or consider fully the arguments for and 
General Tel. Co. ofFlorida v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1067 
(Fla. 1984) (quoting Agrico Chem. Co. v. State Dep't ofEnvtl. Regulation, 365 So. 
2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 316 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1979); 
Florida Beverage Cotp. v. Wynne, 306 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975)). 
54 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.52(8) (West Supp. 1999) (amended 1999). 
ss See id. § 120.56 (West 1996). Minnesota also provides for rule validity 
challenges before an AD. See WILUAM J. KEPPEL, 21 MINNEsOTA PRACTICE: 
ADMINIS1RATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 149-64 (1998). 
56 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.536 (West Supp. 1999) (amended 1999). 
51 See id. § 120.536(2) (amended 1999). 
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against adding a statutory nondelegation provision to Florida's 
AP A. Because it focused its efforts on other issues in its limited 
life, the Review Commission did not assess the impact of this 
provision on other AP A provisions, agency decisionmaking, and 
judicial review. Hence, Florida in 1996 adopted a major 
modification to state administrative procedure witliout serious 
consideration of its effects on administrative governance. 
ill. THE PROBLEMS WITH STATUTORY NONDELEGATION 
When considered solely through the lens of legislative 
accountability, statutory nondelegation standards, like the 
constitutional nondelegation doctrine, appear to be well-intended 
efforts to enhance the accountability of agency decisionmaking. For 
many reformers, efforts to restrict the power of agency regulatory 
authority hold promise to enhance legitimacy and accountability in 
the regulatory process. Legislators see a particular advantage to 
such provisions, as statutory nondelegation allows a legislature the 
constitutional power to delegate and to take credit for reigning in 
the decisions of agencies, particularly where a constituent is 
dissatisfied with the regulatory result. 
Statutory nondelegation, however, poses some serious 
operational problems for agency governance to the extent it 
becomes a part of the general fabric of state administrative 
procedure-either by judicial adoption or by legislative addition to 
a state's APA. There are many problems with statutory 
nondelegation. First, such restrictions are inherently difficult to 
interpret, introducing high levels of uncertainty into judicial and 
agency decisionmaking. Like the constitutional nondelegation 
doctrine, such restrictions are subject to selective enforcement, and 
thus are not likely to achieve their intended result. Second, because 
of the conflict between interpretive ambiguities, on the one hand, 
and legislative directive to restrict agency authority, on the other, 
such restrictions may invite courts (and ALls) to tread into the 
political process, rather than defer to agency interpretations of 
statutes. Third, while such restrictions are designed to increase the 
quality of the legislative process-encouraging legislative 
deliberation about the specifics of regulatory programs before such 
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programs are authorized-their effects on legislative accountability 
are questionable. 
Florida's experience with its 1996 statutory nondelegation 
provision illustrates these problems. The false promise of statutory 
nondelegation has brought other reform issues, such as agency 
interpretation of statutes and judicial review, to the fore in Florida. 
A. Interpreting "Particular Powers and Duties": 
The Florida Experience 
In 1998 the Florida state courts interpreted Florida's new 
statutory nondelegation provision. The most notable decision is St. 
Johns River Water Management District v. Consolidated-Tomoka 
Land Company, 58 an opinion written by a panel of Florida's First 
District Court of Appeal, its main appellate court hearing 
administrative law cases. Despite the "particular powers and duties" 
language added to Florida's APA in 1996, this case upheld an 
agency's authority to promulgate rules without detailed legislative 
authorization addressing each promulgated rule. In this sense, 
Consolidated-Tomoka might be interpreted as a judicial effort to 
temper the counter-revolution against rulemaking in Florida's 1996 
AP A amendments. 59 
The Consolidated-Tomoka case began with a challenge to rules 
promulgated by a Water Management District in the state. The rules 
established two new hydrologic basins in the District's region and 
established new standards pertaining to runoff, recharge, storm 
water systems, and riparian wildlife. 60 In a rule challenge, an ALl 
determined that the proposed rules were supported by competent 
substantial evidence and that they were not arbitrary or capricious. 
58 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998). For discussion of the case and 
its implications, see Martha Mann, St. Johns River Water Management District v. 
Consoliclated-Tomoka Land Co.: Defining Agency Rulemaking Authority Under the 
1996Revisions to the FloridaAdministraJive Proce®re Act, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REY. 
517 (1999). 
59 See Rossi, supra note 3, at 352-53 (discussing the provisions of the 1996 
amendments). 
60 Consolidated-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 75. 
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The ALT, however, reasoned that the rules were invalid because 
they were not within the "'particular powers and duties'" granted by 
the enabling statutes, as required by the new standard in Florida's 
APA.61 Statutory language directed the agency to '"not [allow] 
harmD to the water resources,"' to · .. 'delineate areas within the 
district wherein permits may be required,'" and to "require such 
permits and impose such reasonable conditions" to comply with 
state law. 62 Despite this language, the ALT determined that this 
statutory authorization was inadequate under the new statutory 
nondelegation standard. 63 
The Consolidated-Tomoka panel unanimously reversed the 
ALT' s decision. 64 Based on the language of the AP A and aided by 
dictionary meaning, the court observed that there were two possible 
interpretations of the word "particular" in Florida's statutory 
nondelegation provision. 65 According to the court, either the AP A 
could mean that the powers and duties designated by the statute 
must be "particular" in the sense that they are limited to a 
specifically identified class, or it could mean that they were 
"particular" in the sense that they were described in detail. 66 The 
ALJ's decision, which required very detailed description of 
regulated powers, adopted the latter meaning. 
The judicial panel disagreed with the ALT' s interpretation that 
"particular powers and duties" required a minimum level of detail 
in the statute. 67 Instead, the court held that section 120.52(8) 
"restricts rulemaking authority to subjects that are directly within 
the class of powers and duties identified in the enabling statute. "68 
The court further elaborated: "The question is whether the rule falls 
within the range of powers the Legislature has granted to the agency 
for the purpose of enforcing or implementing the statutes within its 
61 Id. at 76 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.52(8) (West Supp. 1996)). 
62 Id. at 78 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.52(8) (West Supp. 1996)). 
63 Id. at 79. 
64 Id. at 79, 81. 
65 Id. at 79. 
66 Id. at 79-80. 
1>1 Id. at 79. 
68 Id. (emphasis added). 
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jurisdiction. "69 The new standard, the court observed, "is a 
functional test based on the nature of the power or duty at issue and 
not the level of detail in the language of the applicable statute. 1170 
Two concerns with the AU' s interpretation of the "particular 
powers and duties" standard animated the court's decision. First, 
the court reasoned, the AU' s standard, which requires a statute 
describing in detail the subject matter of each rule proposed, "would 
be difficult to define and even more difficult to apply. "71 As the 
court wrote, "[a]n argument could be made in nearly any case that 
the enabling statute is not specific enough to support the precise 
subject of a rule, no matter how detailed the Legislature tried to be 
in describing the power delegated to the agency. "72 Second, the 
court observed, the All's interpretation, which is more restrictive 
of agency authority than the court's, would place agencies between 
two conflicting commands in Florida's APA.73 While Pennsylvania 
places some limitations on agency discretion to choose to use 
rulemaking, 74 Florida is much more restrictive. In Florida, 
"[r]ulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion"75 and agencies 
are required to adopt rules to the extent it is "feasible and 
practicable. "76 But, "[i]f the lack of detail in the enabling statute 
could be said to prohibit an agency from adopting rules . . . , the 
agency might not be able to carry out the very task the Legislature 
assigned to it. "77 By implication, the court reasoned that agencies 
must have the authority to adopt rules within the class of powers 
conferred by the applicable enabling statute, and must not be limited 





74 See Terrance J. Fitzpatrick, The Choice Between Adjudication and 
Rulemakingfor Developing Administrative Policy in Pennsylvania, 4 WIDENER]. 
PuB. L. 373, 381 (1995) (indicating that some Pennsylvania cases have held that 
"agencies have discretion to develop policy via adjudication or rulemaking"). 
15 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.54(l)(a) (West Supp. 1999). 
16 Id. 
77 Consolidated-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 80. 
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to adopting rules only where a statute describes "in detail the subject 
of each potential rule. "78 
Much like the addition of the statutory nondelegation provision 
to Florida's AP A, the case surprised many in Florida. 
Consolidated-Tomoka has been a topic of much controversy-even 
leading to some additional modifications to Florida's APA in 
1999.79 The case and its aftermath in Florida illustrate some of the 
problems with statutory nondelegation, whether judicially-adopted 
or legislatively-imposed in an APA. 
B. Enforcement Problems 
Statutory nondelegation restrictions are inherently difficult to 
interpret, introducing high levels of uncertainty into judicial and 
agency decisionmaking. As the court itself noted in 
Consolidated-Tomoka: 
A standard based on the sufficiency of detail in the 
language of the enabling statute would be difficult to 
define and even more difficult to apply. Specificity is a 
subjective concept that cannot be neatly divided into 
identifiable degrees. Moreover, the concept is one that is 
relative. What is specific enough in one circumstance may 
be too general in another. An argument could be made in 
nearly any case that the enabling statute is not specific 
enough to support the precise subject of a rule, no matter 
how detailed the Legislature tried to be in describing the 
power delegated to the agency. 80 
Like the constitutional nondelegation doctrine, statutory restrictions 
are subject to seleetive enforcement, and thus are not likely to 
achieve their intended result. 81 
18 Id. 
79 These amendments are discussed infra at Part IV. 
80 Consolidated-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 80. 
81 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 11ze Rok of the Judiciary in lmpkmenting an 
Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1244-47 (1989); Richard 
J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Dekgated Power: A Response to 
Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 391, 402-07 (1987); Carl McGowan, Congress, 
' 
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The problem of selective enforcement becomes apparent when 
the opinion in Consolidated-Tomoka is contrasted with that in 
Department of Business and Professional Regulation v. Calder Race 
Course, Inc. , 82 a decision issued by a different panel of the same 
court on the same day. In Calder, the court applied Florida's 
statutory nondelegation section to uphold an AU' s invalidation of 
Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Division) rules authorizing 
warrantless searches of pari-mutuel wagering facilities. As its 
rulemaking authority, the Division cited statutory provisions that 
empowered it to "'adopt reasonable rules for the control, 
supervision, and direction of all applicants, permitees, and licensees 
and for the holding, conducting, and operating of all racetracks, 
race meets, and races held in this state.' "83 In addition, the Division 
cited a provision of the same statute that authorized it to conduct 
"investigations. "84 The court noted, however, that since "nothing in 
. this subsection identifies the power that the rule attempts to 
implement, that is, to search, "85 the agency's proposed rules 
exceeded its grant of authority. 
The Consolidated-Tomoka and Calder duo illustrates the 
indeterminacy of judicial application of Florida's statutory 
nondelegation standard. In Calder, the court concluded that the 
'"class of powers and duties identified in the statute'" did not 
include the power to conduct warrantless searches. 86 At the same 
time, it seems that a reasonable interpretation of the statute 
authorizing rulemaking and investigations by the Division could 
include the power to conduct warrantless searches. Following 
Court, and Control ofDekgated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1128-30 (1977); 
see also SORTIRIUS BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND TIIE DELEGATION OF 
LEGISLATIVE POWER 62, 76 (1975) (descn'bing nondelegation doctrine as "heavily 
encrusted with the constructs of judicial myth-making" and revealing a "judicial 
propensity to manipulate"); Lours JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION 51, 56 (1965) (finding court's reasoning in the nondelegation context as 
"hopelessly fictional rationalization" and "sheer illusion"). 
82 724 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
83 Id. at 102 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 550.0251(3) (West 1992)). 
84 Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 550.0251(9) (West 1992)). 
85 Id. at 102. 
86 Id. at 105 (quoting Consolidated-Tonwka, 717 So. 2d at 80). 
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Calder, it is clear that courts will enforce Florida's statutory 
nondelegation doctrine, yet for agencies it is not at all clear when. 
In addition, for the Legislature, which needs to evaluate existing 
and new statutes for compliance, it is not clear how much 
specificity is required. Thus, to the extent we rely on courts to 
implement restrictions on regulatory authority, statutory 
nondelegation poses some of the same enforcement problems as 
constitutional nondelegation: Courts are simply not capable of 
articulating a coherent and consistent set of standards for evaluating 
the sufficiency of grants of power to administrative agencies. 87 
C. Effects on Agency Accountability: Who Should 
Interpret the Statutory Authority to Regulate? 
Institutionally, a legislature is probably even less capable than 
a court of articulating a clear and understandable nondelegation 
standard. No single standard articulated by a legislature in advance 
of its evaluation of a particular regulatory program, especially a 
standard that is the product of political compromise, is likely to 
provide guidance for regulators. At the same time, statutory 
nondelegation encourages legal challenges to agency regulations. 
Statutory nondelegation invites courts (and, in some states, ALTs) 
to tread into the political process, rather than defer to agency 
interpretations of statutes because of the tension between 
interpretive ambiguities, on the one hand, and a discemable 
legislative intent to restrict agency authority, on the other. This 
impairs agency flexibility in the implementation of regulatory 
programs and also runs the risk of undermining the agency 
accountability goals that proponents of statutory nondelegation often 
embrace. 
In Calder, for example, a Florida appellate court applied its 
own independent interpretation of whether investigations included 
warrantless searches; despite the ambiguity in the Legislature's  
grant of power, the court refused to defer to the agency's reasonable 
87 See supra note 81 (sources discussing indeterminacy problem with 
constitutional nondelegation doctrine). 
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interpretation that investigations included warrantless searches. 88 
This raises the issue of who interprets statutes, an issue that is not 
as settled in the stat� as it is in the federal system. 
Like the courts of many other states, Florida courts have 
endorsed a doctrine similar to Skidmore v. Swift89 (giving some 
weight to the agency interpretation) if not Chevron (accepting the 
agency's  reasonable interpretation where the statute is unclear or 
ambiguous)90 deference in federal courts. If an agency interpretation 
of a statute in its regulatory area "is within the range of permissible 
interpretations of the statute, " in Florida, the standard of review is 
well established: courts defer to the agency interpretation, even 
though other interpretations may be permissible or preferable. 91 
88 Calder, 124 So. 2d at 102-03. 
89 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Under Skidmore, the degree of weight may "depend 
upon the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
factors which give it [the] power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. at 
140. The approach is used in many states. See William A. McGrath et al., Project: 
State Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 43 ADMIN. L. REY. 571, 768-70 
(1991). 
00 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984); see also supra note 16 (discussing Chevron test). According to 
a 1990 study, eleven states had adopted tests that bear similarity to strong Chevron 
deference. See McGrath et al., supra note 89, at 763-66. I believe that Florida 
adopts an analysis very similar to Chevron. 
91 State Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Framat Realty, Inc., 407 
So. 2d 238, 241-42 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see also Department ofEnvtl. 
Regulation v. Goldring, 477 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding 
that "[c]ourts should afford great deference to administrative interpretations of 
statutes which the administrative agency is required to enforce"); Pringle v. Marine 
Fisheries Comm'n, 732 So. 2d 395, 397 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that 
"[t]he courts a.re bound to give deference to an agency's interpretation of statutes the 
agency is charged with implementing"); Smith v. Crawford, 645 So. 2d 513, 520-21 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (providing deference to agency interpretation of 
statute); Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So. 2d 1324, 1327 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
1991) (stating "[b]ecause agency boards are charged with the responsibility of 
enforcing the statutes which govern their area of regulation, courts give great weight 
to their interpretation of those statutes"); accord, Board of Optometry v. Florida 
Soc'y of Opthamology, 538 So. 2d 878, 885 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) 
(suggesting agency's interpretation need not be the most desirable one, but needs 
only to be within the range of permissible interpretations). 
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While well-established as a standard for reviewing agency 
intei:pretations of ambiguous statutory language, Florida courts also 
recognize that in some instances deference is not appropriate. Some 
Florida courts have stated that they do not defer to "clearly 
erroneous" agency interpretations, although they also suggest that 
they do not review statutory intei:pretations de novo for 
reasonableness;92 thus, clearly erroneous review might be thought 
of as the judicial basis for rejecting agency interpretations that 
conflict with clear and unambiguous statutory language, paralleling 
the step-one Chevron inquiry. 93 Florida courts also express some 
92 See D.A.B. Constructors, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 656 So. 2d 940, 
944 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that " [a]n agency's construction of a 
statute which it administers is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned 
unless the agency's interpretation is clearly erroneous"); Orange Park Kennel Club, 
Inc. v. Department of Bus. and Prof'l Regulation, 644 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that, since court is unable to determine that agency's 
interpretation of a statute is "clearly erroneous," deference is appropriate). 
93 See Department oflns. & Treasurer v. Bankers Ins. Co., 694 So. 2d 70, 71 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that " [w]here a statute draws an uncertain 
boundary, judicial deference to an agency's jurisdictional determination is 
appropriate"); Willette v. Air Prods., 700 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1997) (rejecting an agency's statutory interpretation as "unmistakably at odds with 
[the] clear statutory language"); Associated Mortgage Investors v. Department of 
Bus. Regulation, 503 So. 2d 379, 380 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed, 
506 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1987) (holding that "interpretation, made by the agency 
charged with enforcing a statute, should be accorded great deference unless there is 
clear error or conflict with the intent of the statute"); see also Okeechobee Health 
Care v. Collins, 726 So. 2d 775, 778 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (distinguishing 
Willette v. Air Prods. , 100 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997), and 
applying deference to ambiguous statutory language). 
Clearly erroneous (or "clear err") is a troubling standard to apply to the 
review of statutes, as it typically is a standard of review for findings of fact. Some 
Florida appellate courts have conflated, or confused, the clearly erroneous standard 
in reviewing statutes with a "reasonableness" test. See Las Olas Tower Co. v. City 
of Fort Lauderdale, No. 97-2791, 1999 WL 31 1248, at *3 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
May 12, 1999) (noting preference for deference to the agency, but "when the 
agency's construction of a statute amounts to an unreasonable interpretation, or is 
clearly erroneous, it cannot stand"). In the rulemaking context, this confusion may 
be less prevalent because Florida's AP A purports to limit courts from independently 
assessing the rationality of an agency's reasoning process. See FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 120.68(9) (West 1999) (proluoiting reviewing courts from applying arbitrary and 
capricious review of rules apart from their review of an All's findings regarding 
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reluctance to defer to an agency statutory interpretation "if the 
statute is unrelated to the functions of the agency. "94 Despite these 
exceptions for clearly erroneous interpretations or interpretations of 
a statute outside of an agency's regulatory area, principles of 
deference to agency statutory interpretations are well established in 
Florida courts. 
While deference to agency interpretation of ambiguous statutes 
is well accepted in Florida, statutory nondelegation threatens it. By 
requiring courts to assess the specificity of statutory language, 
statutory nondelegation invites more frequent de novo review of 
agency statutory interpretation than is expected under the 
conventional approach. This risks judicial second guessing of 
agency expertise, as well as reduced accountability, to the extent 
judges, not as politically accountable as agency heads, become the 
primary interpreters of statutes. 
Further complicating this issue, in some states, such as Florida, 
rules are subject to challenge before AL.Ts. AL.Ts, however, are not 
bound to agency statutory interpretations, nor does state law always 
clearly require ALT deference to agency statutory interpretations. 
Unlike agency interpretations, which might be legitimated by 
reference to political accountability or agency expertise, statutory 
interpretation by AL.Ts, impartial generalists, should not be subject 
to the same deference. Thus, to the extent courts review final 
agency action by AL.Ts, either deference to the agency or de novo 
review is necessary to ensure accountable statutory interpretation. 
Florida made matters worse in its 1996 amendments by 
reversing the burden of proof in rule challenges. In Florida until 
1996, proposed rules were subject to a "presumption of validity. "  
In other words, when a rule was challenged, the burden was on the 
person attacking the rule to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the rule was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise ran 
arbitrary and capricious agency action). Nevertheless, when misapplied in Florida, 
clearly erroneous may be one back door way to see arbitrary and capricious review 
of agency statutory interpretation where it otherwise is not allowed. 
94 Chiles v. Department of State, 711 So. 2d 1$1, 155 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1998). 
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afoul of Florida' s AP A. 95 Most, if not all, states96 follow a similar 
rule. The 1996 Florida APA revisions, however, provide a process 
for parties to shift the burden of proving the validity of proposed 
rules to administrative agencies. When any substantially affected 
person seeks to challenge a proposed rule as invalid before a 
Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) AIJ, "the proposed 
rule is not presumed to be valid or invalid. "97 The agency, however, 
will now bear the burden of proving a rule's rationality: The 1996 
revisions require agencies to prove in a proposed rule challenge 
proceeding that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of 
delegated authority in response to each of the objections raised by 
the challenger.98 The 1996 revisions also allow " [a] substantially 
affected person [to] seek an administrative determination of the 
invalidity of an existing rule at any time during the existence of the 
rule. "99 The presumption of validity continues to apply for existing 
rules in Florida under the 1996 APA revisions. Once a challenger 
95 See Department of labor and Employment Sec. v. Bradley, 636 So. 2d 802, 
807 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the validity of regulations will be 
sustained so long as " 'they are reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling 
legislation, and are not arbitrary or capricious'") (quoting Adam Smith Enters. v. 
Department of Envtl. Regulation, 553 So. 2d 1260, 1271 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
1989); State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Framat Realty, Inc., 407 
So. 2d 238, 241 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that agency interpretation of 
statutes entitled to presumption of validity); Agrico Chem. Co. v. Department of 
Envtl. Regulation, 365 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that 
"[r}ulemaking by an agency is quasi-legislative action and must be considered with 
deference to that function"). 
96 Pennsylvania is clearly in this group. See Snelling v. Department of Transp., 
366 A.2d 1298 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976) (noting the "presumption that the actions of 
public officials are within the limits" of their discretion"). 
97 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.56(2)(c) (West Supp. 1999) (amended 1999). 
Although slightly amended in 1999, this general provision remains in force. 
98 Id. § 120.56(2)(a). Section 120.56(2)(a) states: 
Id. 
The petition [challenging the rule) shall state with particularity the 
objections to the proposed rule and the reasons that the proposed rule is 
an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The agency then has 
the burden to prove that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of 
delegated legislative authority as to the objections raised. 
99 Id. § 120.56(3)(a). 
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has established a factual basis for objections to a rule, 100 however, 
the agency bears the burden of proving it followed applicable 
procedure and failure to follow applicable procedure is deemed 
material error.101 The Bumpers Amendment to the Federal AP A also 
stated a reviewing court "shall not accord any presumption in favor 
of or against agency action. 11102 
When confusion over the review of state agency interpretation 
of statutes is coupled with the uncertain status of arbitrary and 
capricious review in many states, 103 a need for state AP A reformers 
to clarify the role of courts in reviewing agency rules is apparent. 
Indeed, as is discussed below, in Spring 1999, the role of Florida 
courts was the subject of an AP A reform bill that would have 
prohibited courts from giving any deference or weight to agency 
interpretations of statutes, as they currently do. 104 Perhaps it would 
have been better for Florida reformers to address judicial review 
independent of the statutory nondelegation issue, where conflicts 
between agency, AJJ, and judicial statutory interpretation are at the 
heart of prominent regulatory disputes involving constituents with 
entrenched positions in disputes, such as the environmental 
regulation matter at issue in Consolidated-Tomoka. 
D. Effects on Legis'lative Process and Accountability 
In a sense, statutory nondelegation may work as a type of 
precommitment device for a legislature, deterring future legislatures 
100 See St. Johns River Management Dist. v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co. ,  
717 So.  2d 72, 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 1998) (holding in interpreting section 
120.56(2)(a) that "[a] party challenging a proposed rule bas the burden of 
establishing a factual basis for the objections to the rule, and then the agency has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion to show that the proposed rule is a valid exercise of 
delegated legislative authority"). 
101 FLA. STAT. ANN. §  120.56(1)(c) (West Supp. 1999). 
102 128 CONG. REC. S2717 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982) (statement of Sen. 
Bumpers). 
103 William Funk, in his 1991 survey of state rationality review, reports that 
only eight states follow the federal example of providing a statutory basis for judicial 
review of the rationality of rules. William Funk, Rationality Review of State 
Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 147, 154 (1991). 
104 This 1999 reform bill is discussed infra at Part N. 
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from delegating without very specific statutory guidance. In 
practice, it is difficult for a legislature to avoid delegation, because 
reaching a consensus on specific statutory language may prove 
costly or impossible. Even if a legislature can overcome this 
problem, however, it is questionable whether statutory 
nondelegation works to enhance legislative accountability. 
While such restrictions are in part designed to improve the 
quality of the legislative process-encouraging legislative 
deliberation about the specifics of regulatory programs before such 
programs are authorized-they may have the opposite result, placing 
legislatures in the reactive posture of enacting en rriasse "compliance 
bills" ratifying agency regulations. For example, following 
Florida's adoption of a statutory nondelegation standard, over 5,000 
agency rules-more than twenty percent of Florida's 
regulations-were determined to be out of compliance with the new 
standard. 105 The Legislature sent this list of rules, compiled by 
Florida's  Joint Administrative Procedures Committee with input 
from each agency's  evaluation of its existing rules for compliance, 
to the President of the Florida Senate and the Speaker of the House. 
The Legislature then acted on this list, enacting over two dozen 
rules authorizing bills in 1998. 106 This may have served a useful 
tos See JOINT ADMIN. PROC. COMMITrEE, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, at 62. 
106 The following bill numbers were passed as RABs: S. Res. 734, 16th Leg. 
(Fla. 1999); S. Res. 768, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 770, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); 
S. Res. 1346, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1342, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 
1350, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1706, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1762, 
16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1152, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1720, 16th Leg. 
(Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1708, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1700, 16th Leg. (Fla. 
1999); S. Res. 1702, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 2316, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); 
S. Res. 2000, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 2314, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 
1722, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1 144, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1684, 
16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1332, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res.1410, 16th Leg. 
(Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1716, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1348, 16th Leg. (Fla. 
1999); S. Res. 1232, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1334, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); 
S. Res. 1336, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1436, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 
1440, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1164, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1054, 
16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1052, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 846, 16th Leg. 
(Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1710, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999). A few (three or four) RABs did 
not pass and remain under consideration. 
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housekeeping function, but the conventional understanding is that 
few, if any, of these statutes were the subject of intense legislative 
deliberation and debate regarding the scope of delegated power. 
If accountability in the form of more specific and clearer 
statutes authorizing agency rulemaking is the goal of statutory 
nondelegation, there may be more effective means for achieving this 
goal. For example, a legislature could adopt better (that is, more 
specific and clearer) grants of legislative authority if it considered 
limitations on agency rulemaking authority in subject-specific 
contexts, referring these to the legislative committees responsible 
for regulating certain areas. Under this approach, a legislature 
would be responsible for specifically prohibiting an agency from 
regulating certain activities, rather than attempting to mandate 
statutory precision generally through the judicially-imposed APA 
statutory nondelegation. This is similar to the approach taken by 
federal courts. 
On the other hand, to the extent AP A reformers are wed to 
enhancing agency accountability to the legislature, statutory 
nondelegation should be enforced by legislative committees rather 
than courts. To the extent state legislatures affinnatively vest 
enforcement of statutory nondelegation with courts (and also, as in 
Florida, ALJs), they can claim credit for limiting the scope of 
agency powers without taking responsibility for defining these 
powers in specific regulatory contexts. Legislative definition and 
enforcement of agency rulemaking powers in specific regulatory 
contexts, however, would lead to more responsible decisionmaking 
by a legislature. 
Pennsylvania's Independent Regulatory Review Commission 
(IRRC), for example, already has some authority to review 
regulations for "confonnity to legislative intent"1rn and requires "[a] 
specific citation to . . .  statutory or regulatory authority" for 
regulations, 108 but this works in conjunction with the possibility of 
judicial review enforcement of statutory nondelegation. Not all 
states that adhere to a statutory nondelegation standard for 
107 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 745.2 (West Supp. 1998). 
108 Id. § 745.5(a)(l. 1). 
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rulemaking vest some enforcement with courts. For example, in 
California the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) has the 
authority to disapprove rules based on a lack of "necessity" as well 
as lack of "authority" or failure to include a "reference. 11 109 
"Necessity" means that there is substantial evidence.in the record 
that the regulation is needed. 110 "Authority" refers to "the provision 
of law which permits or obligates the agency to adopt, amend, or 
repeal a regulation. "111 The regulations also define "Reference" as 
"the statute, court decision, or other provision of law which the 
agency implements . . . by adopting, amending, or repealing a 
regulation. " 112 The OAL regulations include as a source of authority 
"a California constitutional or statutory provision [which] grants a 
power to the agency which impliedly permits or obligates the 
agency to adopt, amend, or repeal the regulation in order to achieve 
the purpose for which the power was granted. " 113 Thus the OAL, 
which wields a heavy stick as the enforcer of California rulemaking 
limitations, takes the position that an implied grant of authority is 
sufficient. Nevertheless, even if California's OAL had reached a 
different conclusion about its role, enforcing statutory nondelegation 
more strictly, California would have more legislative accountability 
than states like Pennsylvania, Texas, or Florida, which rely at least 
in part on courts (or ALTs) to enforce the statutory nondelegation 
doctrine. 
109 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11349.l(a)(l), (2), (5) (West Supp. 1999). 
1 10 Id. § 1 1349(a). 
I l l  Id. § 1 1349(b). 
1 12 Id. § 11349(e). 
1 13 CAL. CODE. REGS., tit. 1, § 14(a)(2) (1999). 
HeinOnline -- 8 Widener J. Pub. L. 332 (1998-1999)
332 WIDENER JOURNAL OF PuBLIC LAW [Vol. 8 
IV. FLORIDA'S 1999 APA AMENDMENTS: 
CONTINUED LEGISLATIVE ENDORSEMENT 
OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION AGAINST RULEMAKING 
When Florida added statutory nondelegation to its AP A in 
1996, the new provision received little notice. In the aftennath of 
its revised APA, the 1997 Florida legislative session addressed 
some minor AP A revisions in a glitch bill, 114 but statutory 
nondelegation was not an issue before the Legislature at that time. 
Yet in 1999, following judicial interpretation of Florida's  statutory 
nondelegation provision, Florida's  Legislature again considered 
major APA refonns. Governor Jeb Bush signed new amendments 
to the Florida APA into law in Summer 1999. 115 Not surprisingly, 
the major issues addressed by the 1999 APA amendments are 
statutory nondelegation and agency interpretations of law, issues the 
Florida Legislature brought to the forefront with its 1996 APA 
amendments. 116 One distinction, however, exists between the 1999 
reforms and those adopted in previous years. The 1999 refonns 
were produced with little or no input from or deliberation among 
serious administrative law reformers, including agency lawyers. 
The 1999 Florida APA amendments continue Florida's 
renegade approach to administrative procedure refonn among the 
states. The refonn bill that was signed into law as the 1999 APA 
amendments is much improved over the original bill introduced in 
the Florida Legislature. Yet the refonns adopted in the 1999 APA 
amendments-as well as some refonns considered by the Legislature 
but not adopted-are remarkable in their departure from long­
standing principles of administrative procedure and thus are worthy 
1 14 See Stephen T. Maher, How the Glitch Stole Christmas: 1he 1997 
Amendments to the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
235 (1998). 
115 See 1999 Fla. Laws, ch. 99-379, signed by Governor Jeb Bush, June 18, 
1999. The amendments were based on HB 107, prefiled by Representative Ken 
Pruitt. 
1 16 Cf. Rossi, supra note 3, at 360-61 (predicting that judicial review of agency 
rulemaking authority will become an issue in interpreting Florida's new statutory 
nondelegation provision). 
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of some discussion, particularly because they may resurface in 
Florida and other states experimenting with statutory nondelegation. 
The AP A reform bill considered by the Florida Legislature in 
1999 proposed four major changes to Florida's APA, although the 
adopted amendments made only two of these changes. First, the 
AP A amendments react to ConsolidaJed-Tomoka, effectively 
overruling the court's test and again expressing the Legislature's  
preference for specific powers and duties in statutes as  the 
authorization for agency rules. 117 Second, the original bill (but not 
the adopted version) proposed to overrule Consolidated-Tomoko! s 
interpretation that, in challenges to proposed rules, challenging 
parties bear the burden of going forward with evidence supporting 
the invalidity of a rule. 118 Third, the bill (as amended in committee) 
stated that judges hearing appeals of agency rules shall not defer, or 
otherwise give any special weight, to an agency's interpretation of 
law; this provision, however, was deleted from the .bill late in the 
legislative process and was not signed into law. 119 Fourth, the 
adopted APA amendments change Florida's adjudication process by 
heightening the burden when agencies reject or modify AlJ 
conclusions of law. 120 
Consolidated-Tomoko. attempted to strike a balance between the 
requirement that an agency have "particular powers and duties 11 in 
a statute prior to promulgating a rule, 121 on the one hand, and its 
conflicting command that agencies presumptively pursue 
rulemaking, 122 on the other. The 1999 APA amendments revise this 
balance against agency rulemaking authority, suggesting a continued 
1 17 See amendment to FLA. STAT. §§ 120.52(8), 120.536, CSIHB 107, 179th 
Leg.,  1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-37. 
118 See proposed amendment to FIA. STAT. § 120.56, HB 107, 179th Leg. (Fla. 
1999) (prefiled bill). 
119 See proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 120.68, HB 107cl, 179th Leg. 
(Fla. 1999) (first version approved by the House of Representatives Committee on 
Governmental Rules and Regulation). 
120 See amendment to FIA. STAT. § 120.57, CSIHB 107, 179th Leg.,  1999 Fla. 
Laws. Ch. 99-379. 
121 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.536(1) (West Supp. 1999) (amended 1999). 
122 Id. § 120.54(1)(a)(l). 
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legislative endorsement of the counter-revolution against agency 
rulemaking. 
In interpreting "particular powers and duties, " the 
Consolidated-Tomoko. court held that " [a] rule is a valid exercise of 
delegated legislative authority if it regulates a matter directly within 
the class of powers and duties identified in the statute to be 
implemented. " 123 The 1999 amendments reject this test by revising 
the AP A standard. In the end, the Legislature appears only to 
substitute the word "specific" for "particular" in Florida's statutory 
nondelegation standard and to preclude courts from using the 
Consolidated-Tomoko. test to interpret the new standard, 124 although 
the Legislature has also required agencies to rereview all of their 
existing rules for compliance with the 1999 statutory nondelegation 
standard. 
The 1999 amendment, as signed into law, states that agencies 
may only adopt rules that "implement, interpret, or make specific 
the particular powers and duties granted by the enabling statute. "125 
In addition, the 1999 amendment states that "[s]tatutory language 
granting rulemaking authority . . . shall be construed to extend no 
further [than implementing or interpreting the specific] powers and 
duties conferred by the same statute. " 126 In adopting this new 
standard, the Legislature expressed a preference for the test rejected 
by the appellate panel in Consolidated-Tomoko.. Although the bill 
states "it is not the intent of the Legislature to reverse the result of 
any specific judicial decision, " 127 the 1999 amendments purport to 
preclude courts and AI.Js from applying the Consolidated-Tomoka 
test in future cases. For example, addressing the language of the test 
endorsed by the panel in Consolidated-Tomoka, the 1999 
amendment states: "No agency shall have the authority to adopt a 
123 St. Johns River Water Management Dist. v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land 
Co., 717 So. 2d 72, 80 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
124 Although earlier versions of the bill used the word "detailed,"  the word 
"specific" was substituted later in the legislative process. 
125 Amendment to §§ 120.52(8), 120.536(1), CS/HB 107, 179th Leg., 1999 
Fla. Laws Ch. 99-379. 
126 Id. 
i21 Id. 
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rule only because it . . .  is within the agency's  class of powers and 
duties. "  128 
As with the 1996 statutory nondelegation standard, this new 
standard applies not only to new rules but also to existing rules. As 
agencies were required to evaluate all rules following the 1996 
amendments, they are again required to evaluate all rules for 
compliance with the 1999 standard. Effectively, the Legislature has 
told agencies that it is not satisfied with their evaluation of whether 
rules are based in "particular" powers and duties, even though 
agencies evaluated their rules for compliance with this standard well 
before the Consolidated-Tomoka decision was issued. 129 Agencies 
now must reevaluate all rules to determine whether they are based 
in " specific" statutory powers and duties. As with the 1996 
amendment, the Legislature has established a timetable. Each 
agency is required to provide the Joint Administrative Procedures 
Committee a list of rules exceeding statutory authority under the 
"specific" powers and duties standard, and the Legislature will 
again consider whether rule authorization bills are necessary to 
sustain the rules. 130 As of July 1 ,  1999, existing rules are subject to 
challenge under the new standard. 131 
As was also the case with the 1996 AP A amendments, 
however, agencies have no meaningful guidance as to what the 
amended statutory nondelegation standard means and how courts 
will apply it. Following the 1999 amendments, courts will have to 
come up with a new definition of " specific, " presumably one that 
is not as broad as Consolidated-Tomoka' s definition of "particular. " 
As the Consolidated-Tomoka and Calder duo illustrate, defining 
" specific" will not occur without litigation, both before AI.J s and 
12s Id. 
129 Consolidated-Tomoka was issued in Summer 1998, while the 1996 amended 
AP A required agencies to evaluate their existing rules for compliance with the 
statutory nondelegation standard by October l ,  1997. See FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 120.536(2) (amended 1999). 
130 See amendment to § 120.536(2), CS/HB 107, 179th Leg., Fla. Laws Ch. 
99-379. 
131 See id. If an agency, however, has failed to include a rule on the list of rules 
it submits to the legislature, the rule may be subject to immediate challenge. See id. 
§ 120.536(3). 
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appellate courts. As with the constitutional nondelegation 
doctrine, 132 the development of a determinate standard will likely 
prove an impossible task for AL.Ts or appellate courts. Thus, the 
Florida Legislature's  continued tinkering of the language of its 
statutory nondelegation standard should suggest that the task of 
defining the scope of agency rulemaking authority by general 
language in statutes is a questionable effort at enhancing 
accountability, although members of the Legislature have been 
quick to claim credit for reining in bureaucracy. 133 
A second change proposed in the introduced version of the 
1999 APA reform bill would have overruled 
Consolidated-Tomoka's interpretation of the 1996 amendment that 
removes the presumption of validity that attaches to proposed rules 
and requires agencies to prove the validity of proposed rules in rule 
challenge proceedings. Consolidated-Tomoka interpreted this 
amendment to require that, although the agency has the ultimate 
burden of establishing the validity of proposed rules, the challenger 
has the burden of going forward with evidence supporting the 
objections. The introduced 1999 reform bill would have modified 
this standard in proposed rule challenge proceedings by requiring 
the agency to bear "the burden of going forward and the burden to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence" that a rule is not an 
invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. 134 
The impact of such a change on agencies would be enormous. 
As the court noted in rejecting such an interpretation of the existing 
statutory language in Consolidated-Tomoka: 
[I]t would be impractical to impose such a requirement. As 
the administrative law judge [below] explained, a petition 
challenging a proposed rule might include numerous 
132 See supra note 81. 
133 See Julie Hausennan, New Law Will Ease State Rules Battles, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMEs, June 18, 1999, at 1B (noting that business lobbyists and 
members of the state legislature, including Representative Pruitt, the key sponsor of 
the bill, "applauded Bush's action [of signing the 1999 APA amendments into law] 
as a way to rein in the power of Tallahassee bureaucrats"). 
134 Proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 120.56, HB 107, 179th Leg. (Fla. 
1999) (prefiled bill). 
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objections, not all of which remain in controversy [at] the 
time of the hearing. If the agency had the burden of going 
forward with the evidence, it would be forced to rebut 
every objection made in the petition, if for no other reason 
than to avoid the possibility of an award of attorneys' fees 
for its failure to justify the proposed rule. 135 
337 
Fortunately, the APA amendments that were signed into law 
dropped this provision and clarified that the person challenging an 
agency's rule bas the burden of going forward.136 The 1999 
amended APA retains the agency's burden of proof in rule 
challenge proceedings and clarifies that an agency must bear a 
"preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof.137 
A third major proposed change that was added to the 1999 APA 
reform bill during the legislative process is modification of the 
longstanding principle that courts may defer or give some weight to 
agency interpretations of law. A committee amendment to the 1999 
AP A reform bill would have prohibited courts from deferring or 
giving any weight to agency interpretations of law in rule challenge 
proceedings, as courts give agency interpretations under current 
case law in the federal system, in Florida, and in many states. 138 
This amendment stated that "judges hearing appeals of agency rules 
shall not defer, or otherwise give any special weight, to an agency's . 
interpretation of law or a rule. "139 
The adopted 1999 APA amendments did not contain this 
proposed amendment, because of a late modification to the bill. 140 
135 Comsolidated-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 76-77. 
136 See H.B. 107, 179th Leg. (Fla. 1999) (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.56 
(West 1999)). 
137 See id. 
138 See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. 
139 See proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 120.68, HB 107cl, 179th Leg. 
(Fla. 1999) (first version approved by the House of Representatives Committee on 
Governmental Rules and Regulation); see also House of Representatives Committee 
on Governmental Rules and Regulations Analysis, Report on HB 107 at 11  (Jan. 19, 
1999) (adopting amendment). 
14° Compare proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 120.68, HB 107cl, 179th 
Leg. (Fla. 1999) (first version approved by the House of Representatives Committee 
on Governmental Rules & Regulations) with CSIHB 107, 179th Leg. 1999 Fla. 
Laws Ch. 99-379 (making no amendment to § 120.68). 
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The proposed amendment, introduced in part because of the 
statutory interpretation issue raised by statutory nondegelation, 
stood to greatly enhance the role of courts in reviewing of agency 
rulemaking, at the cost of political accountability and expertise, 
neither of which reviewing courts possess. Thus, it is fortunate that 
the final bill signed into law did not include this provision. 
Nevertheless, a fourth major modification, which survives in 
the adopted AP A amendment bill, modifies agency authority to 
make legal interpretations in adjudication, tilting the balance toward 
ALl or judicial legal interpretations and away from statutory 
interpretations by agencies. In what is certainly the most sweeping 
change in years to adjudication under Florida's  APA, the 1999 
amended AP A prohibits agencies from rejecting or modifying AI.J 
conclusions of law without overcoming a heightened burden. Under 
the version of Florida's  APA that preceded the 1999 amendments, 
agencies had the discretion to reject or modify ALT conclusions of 
law or policy, but were bound to ALT findings of fact if supported 
by competent substantial evidence. 141 The 1981 MS.APA, 142 also 
provides agencies similar discretion to disagree with the finder of 
fact on issues of law and policy. 143 
The 1999 Florida AP A amendments require an agency 
rejecting ALT conclusions of law or interpretation of regulations to 
11 stateO with particularity its reasons 11 and to 11 make a finding that 
its substituted conclusion of law or interpretation of an 
administrative rule is as or more reasonable than that which was 
141 Prior to the 1999 APA amendments, Section 120.57(10) stated: 
The agency in its final order may reject or modify the conclusions of law 
and interpretation of administrative rules [over which it has substantive 
jurisdiction]. The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact 
unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and 
states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not 
based upon competent substantial evidence. 
1 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(l)(l) (West Supp. 1999) (amended 1999); see also 
Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So. 2d 1324, 1327 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) 
(noting there is no statutory requirement "that an agency state with particularity its 
reasons for rejecting conclusions of law that do not involve a penalty"). 
142 MODELSTA1E ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT, § 4-215 (1981), 15 U.L.A. 90-91 
(1990). 
143 Pennsylvania's APA appears to provide the agency similar authority. 
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rejected or modified. "144 This new provision restricts an agency's  
discretion to reject an ALT' s interpretation of a statute or a rule, 
placing agencies in a posture of justifying their departure from ALT 
order. It also introduces an uncertainty: A court might rubber stamp 
an agency finding that its own legal interpretation is reasonable, but 
it is likely that the Legislature intended this provision to allow a 
court more sweeping authority to second guess agency 
interpretations of law. In this sense, the 1999 amendments risk 
expanding the authority of AL.Ts and courts to decide statutory 
interpretation and policy issues in adjudication as well as 
rulemaking. Yet neither AL.Ts nor appellate courts have the degree 
of expertise and political accountability that agency heads do. 
Perhaps of less significance, the 1999 amendments also clarify 
the APA's definition of an "agency"145 and prohibit agencies from 
adopting "retroactive" rules, including rules that are intended to 
clarify existing law .146 On the whole, the adopted 1999 AP A 
amendments are far superior to those initially proposed in the 
Legislature and approved by committees early during the 
consideration of the bill. Nevertheless, the 1999 Florida APA 
amendments continue to endorse a statutory nondelegation doctrine; 
subject existing agency rules to legal challenges that pmport to be 
more restrictive of agency authority to promulgate rules than the 
1996 amendments; and require agencies to go through a costly 
review process that is indistinguishable from what they underwent 
144 FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(1), CS/HB 107, 179th Leg. 1999 Fla. Ch. 99-379 
(amended 1999). In contrast, the prefiled bill would have allowed an agency to 
modify an All's conclusion of law only if it is "clearly erroneous,"  but later 
versions of the bill removed this standard of review. Compare id. , with proposed 
amendment to FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(1), CS/HB 107, 179th Leg. (Fla. 1999) 
(prefiled bill). 
145 See amendment to FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1), CS/HB 107, 179th Leg. 1999 
Fla. Ch. 99-379. 
146 &e amendment to FLA.. STAT. § 120.54(l)(f), CS/HB 107, 179th Leg. 1999 
Fla. Ch. 99-379. The amendment did not define retroactive, nor did it explain how 
this new provision interacts with other provisions of section 120.54, which allow 
agencies to apply rules to clarify existing laws so long as they have initiated 
rulemaking in good faith. The provision was intended to preclude future application 
of the court's holding in Environmental Trust v. Department of Environmental. 
Protection, 714 So. 2d 493, 500-01 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
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following the 1996 AP A amendments. Yet, the amendments provide 
little guidance to agencies, merely substituting the word "specific" 
for "particular" in Florida's  statutory nondelegation provision. The 
amendments also further tilt the balance in statutory interpretation 
away from agencies and toward ALJs and courts. Thus, whatever 
credit the Legishlture may claim for Florida's  1999 APA 
amendments, on the whole, they do not enhance the accountability 
of agency decisionmaking. 
For this reason, as well as the anticipated effects of the 
amendments on health and environmental regulation, many in the 
state urged Governor Bush to veto the 1999 AP A reform bill. 
Environmental groups, in particular, were strongly opposed to the 
changes and Governor Bush's appointed Secretary of the 
Department of Environmental Protection urged a veto of the bill. 147 
The bill, however, had strong support from the Legislature. 
Moreover, the Governor's General Counsel, having met with 
industry lobbyists who supported passage of the bill, 148 had a 
comfort level with the content of the bill, even though the 1999 
AP A amendments significantly reduce the power of executive 
branch agencies vis-a-vis the Legislature, courts, and ALJs. Despite 
many recommendations that he veto the 1999 APA amendments, 
Governor Bush signed them into law on June 17, 1999. 
147 See Julie Hausemum, DEP Chief Warns Against Rules Bill, ST. PEl'EsBURG 
T.IMES, June 17, 1999, at 1B (reporting that Department of Environmental Protection 
Secretary David Struhs urged the Governor to veto the bill because it " 'tips the 
balance too far' toward the Legislature, and would make government 'less efficient 
and potentially less effective'"). As Hausennan, supra note 133, reports, the 
Secretary of the Department of Environmental Regulation disavowed his position 
against the bill when it became clear that Bush would sign it. 
148 See Shirish Date, Bush Down to Wire on Controversial Bill, PALM BEACH 
POST, June 17, 1999, at 13A (noting that Bush assistant general counsel Frank 
Jimenez held a meeting and signed off on a compromise acceptable to two lobbyists 
for industry and developers, but that no one invited lobbyists for environmental 
groups who had been following the bill all year). 
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V. CONCLUSION: 
WHAT LESSONS CAN REFORMERS IN OTHER STATES LEARN 
FROM FLORIDA'S RECENT APA REFORM ExPERIENCES? 
341 
In its judicial adoption of statutory nondelegation, Pennsylvania 
preceded Florida in endorsing this questionable idea in 
administrative procedure. The modest limitations Pennsylvania 
courts have imposed on agencies, however, can hardly compare to 
what Florida did when it endorsed statutory nondelegation, in a 
form similar to the Bumpers Amendment, in its AP A. The addition 
of a rigid statutory nondelegation restriction to Florida's AP A was 
part of a larger effort to reduce agency rulemaking powers. This 
also included additional cost-benefit requirements and increased 
opportunities for rule challenges, as well as attorneys' fees for 
successful challenges to rules. 149 Measured by the goal of reducing 
agency rulemaking powers, Florida's  1996 APA reforms were a 
success. Agencies in Florida simply do not have the same power to 
regulate that they once bad. Moreover, because of dissatisfaction 
with the implementation of many of Florida's  1996 amendments, in 
1999, the Legislature passed additional APA amendments, taking 
still more authority away from agencies. 
Given, however, that the destruction of the ends of regulation 
does not appear to be the goal of most state AP A reformers, I 
would like to suggest more practical lessons from Florida's recent 
AP A reforms. There are five main lessons to be taken from 
Florida's  experience with law reform related to its APA-imposed 
statutory nondelegation requirement. 
First, because of inte:rpretive ambiguities, imposing generic 
restrictions on agency regulatory authority is not likely to be 
effective means for enhancing accountability, even where a system 
of governance has developed a clear understanding of who should 
interpret statutory authority in the administrative context. In many 
states, statutory inte:rpretation is complicated because of the 
presence of a central panel of AI..J s or because of reduced political 
accountability of agencies due to a plural executive branch. In 
149 For description of these reforms, see Rossi, supra note 3, at 362-67. 
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Florida, something similar to Chevron deference has been endorsed 
de jure, but given our institutional setup there is a de facto 
reluctance to apply it across the board. Statutory nondelegation adds 
uncertainty about who should interpret statutory authority, as well 
as uncertainty about how courts and Al.Js will apply our restrictions 
on agency rulemaking. In fact, recent developments in Florida 
enhance the authority of ALls to interpret agency statutes, a result 
that runs counter to the goals of enhanced agency expertise and 
political accountability promoted by deference to the agency. Much 
more certainty and legitimacy could be achieved if the application 
of statutory nondelegation standards were limited to the legislature 
or legislative oversight committees, such as Pennsylvania's IRRC. 
I am not sure how successful the judicially-imposed statutory 
nondelegation requirement has been in Pennsylvania, but there may 
be some sound reasons for abandoning it in your AP A reforms, or 
limiting its enforcement to a legislative committee. 
A second lesson is that extreme measures to reduce agency 
authority are not always successful. Rather than limiting agency 
authority to promulgate rules across the board, it may have been 
more effective for Florida to examine notice requirements or to 
require an elaboration of means for achieving regulatory ends. The 
1981 MSAPA, for example, attempts to enhance the accountability 
of agencies to a state's legislature by requiring specificity in agency 
notice. Although problems may ensue if courts adopt strict scrutiny 
in applying this provision of the·MSAPA, 150 the 1981 MSAPA takes 
a more light-handed approach to statutory nondelegation than states 
like Florida or Pennsylvania. Another approach, endorsed in the 
Oregon AP A, is somewhere between the approach of statutory 
nondelegation and the 1981 MSAPA. Oregon's APA requires an 
agency to make a statement of statutory basis and need for a rule, 
as well as a justification for how the proposed rule meets the 
need. 151 Oregon' s  approach effectively requires an agency to 
make a statement of means and statutory ends, but does not require 
rigorous judicial review of either the means or the ends, including 
150 See supra note 49 (discussing Bonfield's rationale for provision). 
151 See OR. REv. STAT. § 183.335(2)(b)(B)-(C) (1991). 
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the statutory authorization for those ends. 152 These are 
procedural-not substantive-requirements; but we are talking about 
administrative procedure acts. 
A third lesson to take from these restrictions is that many 
reforms to state government-particularly those aimed at the 
substance of regulation-are better made in subject-matter specific 
contexts, rather than in across-the-board statutes such as an AP A. 
Statutory nondelegation, I have argued, may adversely affect the 
accountability by allowing legislators to claim credit for regulatory 
relief without taking responsibility for making a trade off between 
agency discretion and limitations on agency power at a more 
concrete level. For example, in deciding whether a state 
environmental agency has the authority to prohibit local 
development, we are likely to get a better result if the legislature 
addresses this in the specific regulatory context, rather than across­
the-board in an APA. APA-imposed statutory nondelegation not 
only skirts legislative accountability but also leaves much for courts 
to resolve. 153 If a state legislature wishes to prohibit a specific 
agency from regulating an activity, so be it. The legislature, 
however, should be specific in its prohibition, and should have 
deliberated about its decision to foreclose specific regulatory action 
by an agency in a particular regulatory context. In a sense, I am 
advocating the reverse of what Florida adopted in its AP A. If the 
legislature wishes to prohibit otherwise constitutional regulation, let 
it prohibit particular powers and duties in subject-matter specific 
statutes, not invite courts, AIJs, or even legislative committees into 
the political process of regulation. This is akin to the approach that 
courts take in interpreting the Federal AP A, although the recent 
Florida experience might suggest little political hope for this 
approach in some states. 
152 For discussion, see Dave Frohnmayer, National Trends in Court Review of 
Agency Action: Some Reflections on the Model State Administrative Procedure Act 
and New Utah Administrative Procedure Act, 3 BYU J. PuB. L. 1 ,  18-19 (1989). 
153 For criticism of "single-statute regulatory reform" and the conflict it poses 
for existing statutes and laws, see William W. Buzbee, Regu'/atory Refonn or 
Statutory Muddle The "Legis'lative Mirage" of Single Statute Regu'/atory Refonn, 5 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. REv. 298 (1996). 
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Fourth, there are no easy answers to reformers' concerns about 
administrative accountability. Radical quick fixes-I count among 
these statutory nondelegation-are likely to lead to frustration and a 
state' s  revisit of APA reform in subsequent years. Since 1996 
Florida has already addressed AP A modifications twice, most 
recently in a set of 1999 APA amendments reacting to judicial 
interpretation of its 1996 statutory nondelegation provision. The 
1999 amendments continue Florida's counter-revolution against 
agency rulemaking, and will weaken agency discretion to make 
legal interpretations and impair agency flexibility in the 
implementation of regulatory programs. 
A final-and the most important-lesson to take from Florida's  
1 996 and 1999 APA reform experiences is  the importance of 
establishing and utilizing independent law reform commissions to 
guide and evaluate the APA reform process. Although Florida's  
Governor established an ad hoc APA Review Commission in 1996, 
the Commission was short-lived. It succeeded in evaluating and 
recommending many moderate reforms, including several new ideas 
for the state. Its short life, however, precluded the Commission 
from fully evaluating the implementation of its recommendations. 
By the time the Commission finished its main task, the legislative 
session had already begun, with the Commission's  proposals on the 
agenda. The Commission's moderate proposals opened the door for 
special interest groups to use the legislative process to make their 
own radical mark on administrative procedure in the state, outside 
of the deliberations of or evaluation by an independent committee 
process. In 1999, this approach to reform continued in the state with 
little or no serious discussion of the impact of legislative proposals 
outside of the Legislature itself. Several urged the Governor to veto 
the 1999 APA reform bill, but the Governor's Office, which 
participated in some amendments to the bill very late in the process, 
was not about to reject a bill that had strong legislative support. 
Unfortunately, the 1999 Florida AP A amendments continue for 
Florida the counter-revolution against rulemaking it endorsed in 
1996. Hopefully, other states can bypass the ad hoc approach to law 
reform that produced the statutory nondelegation provisions in 
Florida's  1996 and 1999 APA amendments. Utilization of an 
independent law reform commission in making and evaluating 
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legislative proposals, including involvement of a broad range of 
agency heads in the process, might help avoid turning a state APA 
into little more than a strategic tool for the clients of lawyers who 
have not received what they want from agencies or courts. In 
Florida, that is what the recent AP A reform process seems to have 
become. 
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